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On the Legal Status of the Proposition that
"Life Begins at Conception"
Jed Rubenfeld*
For eighteen years, a majority of the Supreme Court has upheld abortion
rights without deciding whether or when a fetus may be regarded as an in-
dependent person. Today, another set of Justices would deny those rights on
the ground that the fetus's status is an issue for state legislators to resolve.
These mirror-image strategies share a common aim: Each allows the Court
to evade the single question that, in every discourse but the judicial one, is by
now synonymous with the abortion debate itself-the question of when
human life begins.1
The policy of avoidance began at the outset of the Court's abortion juris-
prudence. In Roe v. Wade,2 the Court expressly refused to "speculate"
about "this most sensitive and difficult question."'3 Instead, the Roe Court
predicated governmental power to forbid abortion on the putative state in-
terest in "protecting the potentiality of human life."'4 It was this interest in
"potentiality" that the Court held to become "compelling" when the fetus
reaches viability.5
Roe's "potential life" holding had distinct advantages. In particular, by
sustaining a prohibition of abortion on the basis of the fetus's status as a
"potential" person, the Court avoided the necessity of deciding at what point
in a woman's pregnancy a state could deem the fetus an actual person.6
* Associate Professor, Yale Law School. My thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, David
Kornblau, and Amy Chua for their comments and contributions.
1. A note on terminology: "human life" and "person" are not synonymous terms, and per-
sonhood need not logically be defined as an attribute of human life. Thus someone might say that a
fetus (or even an infant) is a human being but not a person--not, that is a creature entitled to legal or
moral rights, in particular, a right to life. See, ag., Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide 2
PmL. & PUB. AFF. 37, 40 (1972). But I take it that the proposition "life begins at conception," as
used in the abortion debate, refers to a concept of human life that includes the essential rights of
personhood. To have force in this debate, calling the fetus a human life (or human being) must
imply that the fetus has a right to life. See note 97 infia. Because I mean by "person" essentially a
creature with a right to life, I shall use the terms "human being," "human life," and "person"
interchangeably. In addition, the word "fetus" in this essay refers to the unborn throughout gesta-
tion, including the embryonic phase.
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. it at 159-60.
4. Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
5. Id. at 163.
6. Perhaps as a result, the question of the fetus's personhood has also remained underexamined
in the volumes of commentary on Roe where issues of constitutional interpretation have
predominated. On the rare occasions when leading scholars--both proponents and opponents of
abortion rights-have raised the issue of fetal personhood, they have generally suggested that it is
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The cost of this approach has now become clear. In abortion cases fol-
lowing Roe, dissenting justices began forcefully to challenge the idea that the
state's interest in protecting "potential human life" somehow hinged upon
the fetus's viability.7 In 1989, a plurality of the Court held in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services8 that this compelling state interest existed
"throughout pregnancy," 9 and it appears that at least four Justices now
share this view.10 By Roe's own logic, to hold that the state's interest in
protecting "potential life" exists equally throughout pregnancy is to hold that
states may bar abortion completely. Thus, with the addition of Justice
Scalia, who has explicitly called for Roe to be overruled,11 there would al-
ready be five votes to do away with Roe-if, that is, Roe's own critical prem-
ise were accepted.
12
But that premise, I propose to show, cannot be accepted: Predicating
abortion regulations on a putative state interest in preserving "potential
human life" is both logically and constitutionally untenable. If the fetus is
considered solely as a "potential" person, no case for a compelling state in-
terest can be made without (1) covertly treating this supposed "potentiality"
as an actuality and (2) inviting wholly insupportable consequences about the
state's power to dictate our reproductive decisions. The "potential life"
premise, first employed to undergird Roe and now to undermine it, is and
has always been erroneous. Only the fetus's status as an actual person, not a
potential person, can provide the compelling state interest necessary to sup-
port a prohibition of abortion. 13
If this is so, however, then the question of judicial competence becomes
all the more pressing. What can judges possibly say about life's beginning
when religions war and science hold its tongue? Whether ultimately a mat-
ter of faith or fact, personhood cannot be a subject fit for judicial resolution.
This conclusion would be unassailable if it were correct to wrap the fe-
tus's personhood in a veil of religious or medical mystery. But this view of
personhood is surely misconceived, at least in assessing the validity of abor-
irrelevant to the constitutional outcome. Compare LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH
oF ABSOLUTEs 129-35 (1990) (arguing for abortion rights even assuming fetuses are persons) with
John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf' A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. 920, 926
(1973) (arguing against abortion rights even assuming fetuses are not persons).
7. See, eg., Tlornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 795 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe State's interest, if compelling after viability, is equally
compelling before viability."); id. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that state's interests in
ensuring maternal health and protecting potential life exist throughout pregnancy); Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 460-61 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[P]otential
life is no less potential in the first weeks of pregnancy than it is at viability or afterward.").
8. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
9. Id. at 3057 (plurality opinion).
10. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy formed the Webster plurality,
and Justice O'Connor had already taken this position in prior cases. See note 7 supra.
11. See, eg., Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3064-65 (Scalia, J., concurring); text accompanying note 67
infra.
12. For this reason, some commentators hailed Webster as spelling the "de facto" end of Roe.
See, eg., James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, What Does Webster Mean?, 138 U. PA. L. REv.
157 (1989).
13. See Part II infra.
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tion laws. Religious tenets can play no part in a state's determination of fetal
personhood, for obvious constitutional reasons. And personhood is not a
matter of fact. It is not a thing or a concrete property inhering in a thing. It
is a status, legal and moral, that we confer as a normative matter at a certain
point in human development. Stripped of any reifying (or theifying) prem-
ises, personhood is no different in its conceptual structure from another sta-
tus conferred later in life: adulthood.
14
What follows from this? First, as with adulthood, there need be no
unique or absolute legal answer to the "question of personhood." This not
only means that different legislatures may answer the question differently; it
means that different answers may be appropriate in different contexts-abor-
tion, inheritance, assault, and so forth--depending on the particular legal or
moral considerations at issue.
Second, again as with adulthood, there may nonetheless be limits on a
state's discretion in determining the advent of personhood-limits imposed
by the concept itself, if it is to retain any normative meaning, as well as
limits imposed by the Constitution. 15 Just as it would be absurd and likely
unconstitutional for a state to deem adulthood to begin at age two or sixty,
so too there may be limits on a state's discretion to decide when personhood
begins.
Finally, the consequences of deeming a fetus a person must be recognized
as relevant to the decision of when (if ever) a fetus acquires this status.
When states establish the age of fifteen as the advent of adulthood for the
purposes of criminal liability or twenty-one for drinking, they take into ac-
count not only matters of biological development, but also the interests of
other parties. So too, in determining the advent of personhood, it is appro-
priate for states to treat the effects that this status will have on others as a
consideration within the determination itself.
Indeed, in the specific context of abortion law, consideration of the con-
sequences is more than appropriate; it is constitutionally required. Because
it establishes the point at which a woman's constitutional right may be
abridged, the determination of a fetus's personhood cannot be divorced from
the constitutional interests protected by that right. To conduct this inquiry
without taking into account those constitutional interests would be like try-
ing to discern the nature of a "clear and present danger" while excluding any
reference to the principles and purposes of the first amendment. If these
premises are accepted, I shall argue, then the proposition that "life begins at
conception" must, for constitutional purposes, be rejected.
16
Part I of this article sets forth the applicable doctrinal framework, with
particular focus on Roe and Webster. Part II critically examines the propo-
sition that the preservation of "potential human life" is a compelling state
interest capable of supporting the proscription of abortion. Part III takes up
14. See Part III.A, B infra.
15. See Part III.C infra.
16. See Part III.D infra.
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the issue of fetal personhood. Unless the right to privacy is abolished, the
Court has no choice but to address this issue and, I shall try to show, no
choice but to resolve it so as to prevent states from blocking abortion
altogether.
I. DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK
For purposes of this article, we shall assume that the constitutional right
of privacy has not been repudiated.17 More specifically, we shall assume
that in considering Roe, the Court will remain bound by the contraception
cases, notably Griswold 1 8 and Eisenstadt.19 The Webster plurality expressly
stated that it was not calling these cases into question,20 and no serious chal-
lenge to them currently appears tenable.21 So long as these cases stand, our
constitutional law recognizes a right not to have the state dictate one's "deci-
sion whether to bear or beget a child."' 22 Prohibiting abortion would plainly
contravene this right and hence would be permissible only if necessary to
further a "compelling state interest."'23 Given this doctrinal framework, the
relevant question, as formulated in both Roe and Webster, is whether the
state has a "compelling" interest in the preservation of a fetus. 24
To be sure, we are presupposing that abortion concerns the "decision
whether to bear or beget a child" just as contraception does, so that the
"liberty interest" involved in both actions is of the same constitutional mag-
nitude. Despite its straightforwardness, this presupposition (which is neces-
sary to our claim that abortion can only be proscribed in order to satisfy a
compelling state interest) might conceivably be challenged.
For example, Justice White has argued that the presence of a fetus in the
abortion decision alters "the characterization of the liberty interest itself."25
17. If the Court were to renounce the right of privacy altogether, then under current doctrine
antiabortion laws would presumably be valid regardless of the fetus's personhood. Cf, eg., Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that antisodomy laws did not implicate the right of
privacy and were therefore valid even if based solely on "majority sentiments" about the "morality"
of the proscribed conduct). Should antiabortion laws ever be held to implicate other constitutional
guarantees (such as that of equal protection), the question of the fetus's status would again become
relevant and the arguments presented herein would still apply.
18. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
19. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); see also, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977).
20. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3058 (1989).
21. Justice White concurred in the Court's judgment in both cases, see Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at
463-64; Grismold, 381 U.S. at 502-03, and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy specifically indicated
their support for these cases in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2346 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
22. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
23. See, eg., Carey, 431 U.S. at 686. The "compelling state interest" test applies to numerous
constitutional guarantees quite apart from the right of privacy. See text accompanying notes 31-33
infra; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (citing cases). To pass this test, a law not only must
further a compelling state interest, but must be "narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
interests at stake." Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
24. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057 (plurality opinion); Roe, 410 U.S. at 155, 163.
25. Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792
n.2 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
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According to Justice White, abortion laws should "call into play [only] the
most minimal judicial scrutiny";26 otherwise the Court would be "interpos-
ing a constitutional barrier to state efforts to protect human life and...
investing mothers and doctors with the constitutionally protected right to
exterminate it.
' '27
This sort of argument 28 simply prejudges the decisive issue: whether a
fetus constitutes an independent human life from the moment of concep-
tion.29 If the fetus is regarded as a person, then of course the state has a
compelling interest in protecting it. In the absence, however, of any precon-
ceived idea about fetal status, it becomes quite difficult to explain why abor-
tion differs from contraception. Without more, the claim that abortion
differs because of the presence of a fetus simply begs the question-the ques-
tion, that is, of whether the state's interests in the fetus are sufficiently "com-
pelling" to override a constitutionally recognized right.30
But what is a "compelling" state interest? Unfortunately, scant jurispru-
dence exists on this subject. This creates a doctrinal instability not only for
the right to privacy, but for all the rights to which the "compelling state
interest" test applies-for example, the guarantees of equal protection l and
free speech.32 In some areas, the criteria necessary to establish a compelling
state interest have been more narrowly articulated.3 3 On the whole, how-
ever, the compelling state interest doctrine remains an unstructured balanc-
26. Id. at 790 (White, J., dissenting). To say that a law is subject to "strict scrutiny" is to say
that the compelling state interest test will be applied. By "the most minimal judicial scrutiny,"
Justice White is presumably referring to a mere rationality test.
27. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
28. Cf Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2343 n.4 (1989) (plurality opinion) (con-
demning the "strange procedure of looking at the act which is assertedly the subject of a liberty
interest in isolation from its effect upon other people").
29. Justices White and Scalia could not rescue their argument by saying that abortion at least
destroys the "potential" for human life; the very same could be said of contraception. In any event,
all such arguments go to the state interest at issue, not the nature of the liberty interest. See Walter
Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme Court The Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 138
U. PA. L. REv. 83, 94 (1989).
30. But perhaps it will be said that Griswold and Eisenstadt stand for a constitutional liberty
interest not in deciding whether and when to have children, but only whether and when to conceive
them, In that event, abortion would implicate quite a different liberty interest. Eisenstadt's express
language, however, is to the contrary. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasizing the right to be
free from state intrusion into one's "decision whether to bear or beget children") (emphasis added).
Moreover, apart from concerns about the police invading a bedroom for evidence (mentioned in
GrLivold but not implicated or raised in subsequent cases such as Eisenstadt), an interest in control
over conception makes little sense in the absence of an interest in control over reproduction. Why
protect the decision to conceive except to protect the decision to bear?
Someone might yet protest that the freedom to buy and use contraceptives is itself a constitu-
tionally adequate protection of the reproductive decision or at least so sufficient a protection that a
prohibition of abortion need not be supported by a compelling state interest. As to these objections,
which do not challenge the existence of the liberty interest as such, see note 134 infra and accompa-
nying text.
31. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1397 (1990).
32. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
33. To take a familiar example, the Court long ago held that a state may prohibit speech
otherwise insulated by the first amendment if such speech would create a "clear and present danger"
of a harm that the state is empowered to avert. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Texas, 482 U.S. 451,461
(1987); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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ing test in which our constitutional guarantees may always give way to
raisons d'dtat. This conclusion may be somewhat disconcerting, but the
problem belongs to constitutional law as a whole, not the right of privacy in
particular.
Although there are no set formulas defining compelling state interests,
the case law suggests one observation of particular importance to the abor-
tion question. When someone's conduct invades the protected interests of
another individual, the state's burden is far more easily satisfied. First
amendment rights, for example, are generally limited by the laws of battery
and trespass. I am not permitted to protest a politician's face by rearranging
it; nor does my right to demonstrate allow me to march on my neighbor's
lawn.34 And the compelling state interest test would certainly seem satisfied,
as we have already suggested, if my conduct would take another person's
life.35
This conclusion is of course what makes the fetus's personhood impor-
tant in the abortion debate. But neither Roe nor Webster rests in any way on
a determination that the fetus is or becomes a person at some point in preg-
nancy. To the contrary, as noted above, both Roe and Webster hold that the
state has a compelling interest in preserving the fetus as a "potential" person
regardless of its actual personhood. This is the proposition I shall attempt to
refute in Part II. Let us carefully review, therefore, the relevant passages in
Roe and Webster.
Were the fetus a person, the Roe Court acknowledged, a compelling state
interest would undoubtedly exist.36 The Court stressed, however, "the wide
divergence of thinking on this most sensitive and difficult question."'37 Doc-
tors, the Court observed, differed on the subject. Some viewed conception as
the moment at which human life begins, others viability, and still others
birth.38 Religious groups also took sharply contrasting and in some cases
internally inconsistent positions.39 Finally, the common law did not treat
34. See eg., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
35. See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra. An argument has been made for abortion rights
even assuming that the fetus is a person. See, eg., L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 129-35; Donald H.
Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979). Both of these commentators draw
heavily on Judith Thomson, A Defense of Aborfion, 1 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 47 (1971), who suggests
that sustaining the life of another person physically attached to one's body is an act of good
samaritanship-virtuous but not obligatory according to conventional norms. Whether or not
Thomson's argument succeeds, it hardly follows that states cannot constitutionally require acts of
good samaritanship, particularly where lives (or compelling state interests in general) are at stake.
So far as I know, the Constitution does not enact Spencer's "rhe Proper Sphere of Government" any
more than it does his Social Statics As to the further claim that requiring a "good samaritan" duty
in the abortion context violates the equal protection clause, I do not see how this advances the
argument. Equal protection also yields in the face of compelling state interests. See note 31 supra;
see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10, at 1356-57 (2d ed. 1988)
(criticizing Regan's position); Ronald Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case, N.Y. REv., June 29, 1989,
at 49, 50 (same). We shall assume, at any rate, that determining a fetus to be a person would, with
certain very limited qualifications, entitle a state to prohibit abortion.
36. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-59 (1973).
37. Id. at 160.
38. Id
39. For example, the Court noted that the Roman Catholic Church had until the mid-nine-
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fetuses as persons "in the whole sense" at least until "quickening," and in
many cases not until birth.40
The Court drew two conclusions from these observations. First, it stated
that the judiciary could not be expected to resolve the problem of fetal per-
sonhood. "When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, phi-
losophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at
this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to
speculate as to the answer." 41 Second, and still more important, the Court
held that state legislatures as well were not in a position "to speculate" about
fetal personhood. "In view of [the wide divergence of thinking], we do not
agree that, by adopting one theory of life, [a state] may override the rights of
the pregnant woman that are at stake." 42
Thus disposing of the question of when a fetus becomes an actual per-
son,43 the Court went on to hold that the fetus nevertheless represented the
potentiality of a person, and that there was an "important and legitimate
[state] interest in protecting the potentiality of human life." 44 This interest,
the Court ruled, becomes "compelling" when the fetus reaches "viability,"
the point at which the fetus "has the capability of meaningful life outside the
mother's womb."45 Consequently, only after viability could abortion be pro-
teenth century taken the position that life begins upon fetal "animation," but subsequently insisted
upon conception as the relevant event. Id at 160-61. As to the time when the fetus became "ani-
mate," Catholicism followed Aristotle, holding that animation occurred at about 40 days in the case
of male fetuses and at about 80 days in the case of females. Id at 133-34. By contrast, the predomi-
nant Jewish and Protestant view was said to be that the fetus does not attain personhood until birth.
Id. at 160.
40. Id at 132-36.
41. Ia at 159.
42. Id. at 162.
43. An entirely distinct question of fetal personhood is whether the fetus is a "person" within
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. The Roe Court answered this question in the negative.
Id at 158.
Professor Dworkin, supporting the Court's conclusion on this point, has suggested that this
issue disposes of the abortion question altogether. See Dworkin, supra note 35, at 49. "[No state,"
he argues, "is free to deny or substantially curtail rights the Constitution does establish by recogniz-
ing rights, or right bearers, that it does not." Id. at 50 n.6. Thus for Dworkin, as for Tribe and Ely,
see note 6 supra, the fetus's actual personhood is irrelevant to a woman's right of abortion: A state
could ban abortion only if fetuses were "constitutional persons" in the sense just described. Id at
49-50.
Dworkin's position seems difficult to maintain. The Supreme Court has in other contexts recog-
nized compelling state interests that do not appear to reflect rights "establish[ed]" by the Constitu-
tion. See, eg., Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2839 (1989) (holding that states
have a compelling interest in "preventing minors from being exposed to indecent" speech). But
perhaps Dworkin's objection is to the compelling state interest doctrine itself. For so long as we
have such a doctrine, it seems quite odd to propose that the Constitution, heretofore understood to
establish the rights states must protect, should also be read to establish all the interests that states
may protect, even those interests that can become so "compelling" as to permit the curtailment of
constitutional rights.
In any event, we shall assume (as did the Court in Roe) that excluding fetuses from the defini-
tion of "persons" protected by the due process and equal protection clauses does not resolve the
abortion question, because if fetuses may be deemed actual persons, then a compelling state interest
would nonetheless be established.
44. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973) (emphasis added).
45. Id at 163.
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scribed.46 This occurred around twenty-four to twenty-eight weeks after
conception, 47 or roughly the beginning of the third trimester of pregnancy.
The Court made no attempt to explain why states could claim an interest in
"the potentiality of human life" or why this interest became compelling only
after viability.
The viability standard and trimester-based approach announced in Roe
survived without considerable change until Webster." In Webster, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, condemned both the "key ele-
ments of the Roe framework-trimesters and viability."4 9 The plurality
stated: "[W]e do not see why the State's interest in protecting potential
human life should come into existence only at the point of viability, and that
there should therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability
but prohibiting it before viability." 50 Endorsing language from the dissent-
ing opinions in a prior abortion case, the plurality held that the state had a
"'compelling interest' in protecting human life throughout pregnancy." 51
The Webster plurality, like the Roe majority, refrained from rendering
any determination about the personhood of a fetus. In Webster as in Roe,
the fetus's status as a "potential life" was held to be a sufficient predicate for
finding a compelling state interest that permitted the regulation of abortion.
The crucial difference is that according to Roe, this compelling interest be-
gins only upon viability, whereas according to the Webster plurality, it be-
gins upon conception.
Although the Webster plurality claimed that it had declined to pass upon
the fundamental holding of Roe,52 Justices Scalia and Blackmun appear to
be quite correct in asserting that the plurality's opinion, if taken to its logical
conclusion, implicitly overrules that holding.53 Once a compelling state in-
terest in the fetus is recognized upon conception, it seems clear that under
current doctrine a complete prohibition of abortion would have to be
upheld.54
46. Id. at 160.
47. See id. at 163-65.
48. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). Webster upheld, inter alia,
a state law requiring doctors to perform certain tests to determine viability. A plurality of three
justices found that this law contravened the Roe framework because the tests would be performed on
some previable fetuses. Id. at 3056. The plurality took advantage of the opportunity presented by
this conclusion to overrule Roe in part. Id at 3056-57. Justice O'Connor saw no conflict with Roe,
but concurred in the Court's judgment. See id at 3060-61 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia
also concurred, but on the ground that Roe should be overruled in toto. See id at 3064 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented.
49. Id at 3056-57.
50. Id. at 3057.
51. Id (citing Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
795 (1986) (White, J., dissenting); id at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
52. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3058.
53. Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring); id at 3077 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54. Id at 3076-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Since, in the plurality's view, the State's interest
in potential life is compelling as of the moment of conception, and is therefore served only if abortion
is abolished, every hindrance to a woman's ability to obtain an abortion would be constitutional.").
Confirming Justice Blackmun's prediction, the Justices who formed the Webster plurality (together
with Justice Scalia) have more recently indicated that they would apply a mere rationality test to
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Should the Court eventually draw this conclusion from Webster's prem-
ises, Roe itself will have been partially to blame. It was Roe that recognized
a compelling state interest in protectingpotential human life, and if there can
ever be such an interest, then the Webster plurality is quite right to question
why it should be marked at viability rather than at conception. To be sure,
viability can be viewed as a point at which a "potential life" comes an impor-
tant step closer to actuality; but a pre-viable fetus is no less a potential
human being just because current medical technology is not yet sufficiently
advanced to allow it to continue its development outside the womb."5 More-
over, so long as the fetus is considered solely as a potential person, the state's
interest remains substantially the same before and after viability. At either
stage, the state is confronted with a potential human life, whose capacity to
become actual can only be preserved through a ban of abortion.5 6
Moreover, in a framework based on the fetus's status as a potential life,
to focus on the point of viability within the progress of a pregnancy seems
precisely to cut against Roe's ultimate holding. For if the state interest sup-
porting antiabortion laws is the preservation of potential life, surely the
state's justification for prohibiting abortion is stronger prior to viability,
when an abortion will necessarily destroy that potential.5 7 The problem is,
quite simply, that Roe's viability holding cannot be squared with its "poten-
tial life" premises.58
Suppose, therefore, we concede that the Webster plurality has the better
of the argument in this limited but critical respect. The plurality's opinion
nonetheless rests on the unexplained proposition, taken directly from Roe,
that abortion laws can be predicated upon a compelling state interest in pre-
abortion regulations. See Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2983-84
(1990) (plurality opinion).
55. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 460-61 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
56. In support of Roe, it is often said that the chances of spontaneous abortion are quite high
early in a woman's pregnancy. See, e.g., Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics"
Writing for an Audience of One, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 119, 146 (1989); Langerak, Abortion: Listening
to the Middle in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE 174, 177-79 (J. Arras & R. Hunt eds. 2d
ed. 1983). But which way does this argument cut? Surely it is not the state's interest in potential
life, but the woman's interest in deliberately aborting her pregnancy, that most directly increases as
the chances of a spontaneous abortion diminish. At any rate, the state's interest in the fetus qua
potential human life-assuming it has such an interest at all-does not seem to increase during
pregnancy. It is rather the probability (or the proximity) of the fulfillment of this interest that
increases.
57. After viability, one might even argue, the state would be obliged topermit women to termi-
nate a pregnancy, provided that the procedure allowed the fetus a chance to survive. See, e.g., John
A. Robertson, Medicolegal Implications of a Human Life Amendment, in DEFINING HUMAN LIFE:
MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 161, 166 (M. Shaw & A. Doudera eds. 1983).
58. The difficulty of maintaining Roe's position is reflected in Justice Blackmun's dissent in
Webster, where instead of offering an argument, he could only insist that "the viability standard
takes account of the undeniable fact that as the fetus evolves into its postnatal form, and as it loses its
dependence on the uterine environment, the State's interest in the fetus' potential human life...
becomes compelling." 109 S. Ct. at 3075 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added), The proposi-
tion that the state's interest in potential life becomes "compelling" at any gestational point is not a
factual matter, and the proposition that it becomes compelling at viability is hardly undeniable.
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serving "potential human life." And this proposition, as we shall see below,
cannot be defended.
Let us pause for one moment, however, to take account of a position
somewhere between Roe and Webster that Justice O'Connor has sought to
stake out in a series of separate opinions.
Alone among those justices who concurred in Webster, Justice O'Connor
voiced serious reservations in that case about a wholesale overruling of
Roe.59 Despite her criticisms of Roe's trimester approach6° and her appar-
ent agreement with the plurality's view that states have a compelling interest
in "potential" human life "throughout pregnancy, '61 Justice O'Connor has
suggested a framework in which abortion regulations would be upheld un-
less they imposed an "undue burden on a woman's abortion decision." 62
The problem for Justice O'Connor is the seeming conflict between hold-
ing that states have a compelling interest in potential life from conception
and maintaining any caution about overruling Roe. Justice Scalia, in his
surprisingly vituperative concurrence in Webster, denounced Justice
O'Connor's proposed burdensomeness standard as "irrational. ' 63 In Justice
Scalia's view, to recognize a compelling state interest in potential life
throughout pregnancy is "effectively [to] overrule Roe," which he believed
should have been done "explicitly." 64
Quite possibly, however, Justice O'Connor has in mind an understanding
of the state's interest in potential life less rigid than the current dichotomy
between "compelling" and "noncompelling" interests permits-either al-
lowing or disallowing regulation. Despite believing that the state's interest
in potential life cannot be limited to the viable fetus, Justice O'Connor none-
theless seems troubled about holding that this interest automatically entitles
a state to supersede the woman's right of privacy. Although this leaves her
in an awkward position from the standpoint of current doctrine, we shall see
whether Justice O'Connor's or Justice Scalia's view is ultimately more
defensible.
II. THE STATE'S INTEREST IN POTENTIAL LIE
As we have seen, the fetus's status as a "potential human life" has been
the foundation of the state's power to prohibit abortion since the Court de-
59. Id at 3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
60. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416,458 (1983) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
61. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828
(1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 461 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
62. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3063 (1989) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring). Justice O'Connor's standard, to be precise, is that abortion regulations not imposing such
an "undue burden" would be upheld so long as they were rationally related to a legitimate state
purpose. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2949-50 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Akron, 462 U.S. at 453, 462 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
63. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3066 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring).
64. Id at 3064; see also, eg., Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972,
2984 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (advocating the overruling of Roe).
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cided Roe v. Wade. In this section, therefore, we put aside the question of
the point at which the fetus can be deemed an actual person, and instead
consider the fetus solely as a "potential" person. Even as we set this ques-
tion aside, however, we must proceed with caution: What exactly are we
setting aside?
At the point in our ontogeny where an independent human life-a per-
son-is recognized, a being with distinct ends and interests of its own must
then be reckoned with. As we saw earlier, the authority of the state to pro-
tect an individual's personal or property rights is usually presumed, even
when doing so impedes the exercise of others' constitutional rights. Accord-
ingly, if the fetus were deemed a person, a state could justify antiabortion
laws on the basis of the fetus's own interests as a rights-bearing human be-
ing. Thus, by putting the personhood of the fetus momentarily aside, we are
for the time being precluding the state from claiming that the fetus's rights
as a human being provide the requisite compelling state interest.
However, as John Ely pointed out shortly after the Court decided Roe,
no rule or doctrine holds that a compelling state interest can exist only when
harm to a person is threatened:
Dogs are not "persons in the whole sense"..., but that does not mean the
state cannot prohibit killing them: It does not even mean the state cannot
prohibit killing them in the exercise of the First Amendment right of polit-
ical protest. Come to think of it, draft cards aren't persons either.
65
Ely's remarks emphasize the point that, as a logical matter, the killing or
destruction of things other than persons can equally impinge on state inter-
ests to such a degree that the state may prohibit conduct otherwise protected
by constitutional rights. Ely may, however, have underestimated the diffi-
culties inherent in explaining what the alternative compelling state interests
could be in the case of abortion. Let us look more carefully at his examples,
which are quite instructive.
An analogy to animal rights in the abortion context has a superficial ap-
peal, but is in reality very troublesome. To be sure, the analogy reminds us
that humans are not the only beings that can be said to have interests or even
rights. But the relevance of this point to abortion is unclear. To understand
the fetus as a "potential life" is not to understand it as an actual, but less
than human, animal. And the right-to-life movement is hardly dedicated to
elevating the fetus to the status of a housepet.
But what, in any event, is the legal status of a housepet? Even if human
fetuses were deemed to have this status prior to their personhood, it would
by no means follow that abortion could be proscribed. Where is the compel-
ling state interest? Animals are routinely killed in furtherance of mere
human desires and impulses, much less constitutional rights. I doubt very
much that the interest in protecting an animal, rather than a human, could
65. Ely, supra note 6, at 926.
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be said to be of sufficient weight to force a woman to bear a child against her
wil.
It may be true, as Ely suggests, that a state could forbid the killing of
certain animals generally and then apply that proscription as a kind of
"manner" regulation to someone exercising his first amendment right of pro-
test. But if the effect of the proscription were to destroy the right altogether,
as would be the case with respect to abortion, the result would surely be
different. Would anyone contend, for example, that a law prohibiting all
mass political demonstrations could be predicated on a compelling state in-
terest in animal life, even upon proof that a certain number of ants (or, for
that matter, stray dogs) would necessarily be killed by the throng?"
Let us turn to Ely's comment about draft cards. As this remark suggests,
even if a fetus has no interests as an end-in-itself, the state might still have
independent interests in protecting it. When the Supreme Court upheld the
prosecution of draft card burners, the state interest at issue was not some
inherent right against burning enjoyed by the cards as ends-in-themselves,
but the preservation of the military service selection system in which these
cards played a functional role.67 Thus the state may have its own legitimate
interests that qualify as compelling entirely apart from the protection of any
particular individual's personal or property rights.
The question therefore becomes whether the state has interests of its own
in the "potential life" of the fetus, apart from any interests the fetus might
have if it could be deemed a person. And the answer is indisputably yes.
There are a number of clearly identifiable state interests in the fetus qua
potential life. Whether these interests could support a prohibition of abor-
tion is a different matter.
First, without doubt the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring the
health of delivered infants, if for no reason other than that unhealthy chil-
dren may tax important social resources. But this interest, whatever its
strength,68 depends on the baby actually being born. It does not apply in the
abortion context, for the simple reason that an abortion results in no birth.
Second, the state has an equally clear interest in the size of its popula-
tion, an interest raising numerous, complex issues. Among these, perhaps
the most difficult is the question of whether the need to decrease population
growth could form a constitutionally sufficient basis to impose limits on
childbearing. Prohibitions of abortion, however, do not raise this problem.
66. Ely's law would be a "manner" regulation in that the protester would presumably have
alternative means of exercising his constitutional rights. Cf., ag., Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding prohibition of sleeping in public park as a valid
"manner" regulation of individuals protesting policies on homeless). But a pregnant woman has no
alternative means of exercising her right. As Professor Tribe has succinctly put it, "Nobody has to
kill an animal ... in order to exercise the right to engage in freedom of speech," but if a woman
chooses to have an abortion, "she has no alternative other than [to end] the fetus's life." L. ThmE,
supra note 6, at 114-15 (original emphasis).
67. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
68. See Developments in the Law--Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HAv. L. REv. 1519,
1556-84 (1990) (student author).
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At most, one might ask whether antiabortion laws could be justified on the
basis of a compelling state interest in increasing the size of our population.
This question is much easier to dispose of: There is no such compelling state
interest. 69 And even if there were, an antiabortion law surely could not be
sustained as a "narrowly drawn" 70 means of furthering it.
Finally, there is another constellation of putative state interests sur-
rounding the fetus, considered as a potential life, that may loosely be called
social engineering interests. The importance of these interests in the abor-
tion context should not be underestimated. They include preserving wo-
men's traditional roles as wife and mother as well as shaping the genetic
make-up of individuals' offspring. These interests, if a state may properly
invoke them, would strongly support governmental intervention in women's
child-bearing decisions (including the decision of whom to beget children
with). But surely these interests are constitutionally illegitimate; they con-
tradict the very principle of privacy. 71 To set up such interests as counter-
balancing factors that could outweigh the privacy right would be like relying
on a state interest in brainwashing the populace in order to override the first
amendment.
And isn't that the end of the matter, so long as the fetus is considered
solely as a potential rather than an actual life? The state has no compelling
interests of its own in protecting this potential life from being aborted, and
the fetus, qua potential life, has no interests as an independent person that
the state can claim to be protecting.
But perhaps we have been too hasty in supposing that a fetus, considered
only as a potential life, has no interests of its own. Someone will say that a
potential life at least has potential interests, and that having potential inter-
ests cannot be equated with having no interests at all. One of our assump-
tions, after all, has been that the compelling state interest test can be satisfied
by a showing that the conduct the state seeks to forbid would violate gener-
ally protected legal interests. Are there not numerous instances in which the
law affords protection to potential interests?
Certainly, there are identifiable, protectable, and indeed protected inter-
ests that might be called potential in nature. For example, although I have
never met any remaindermen, I am quite sure they have legally enforceable
interests in the estates they may one day possess. But this sort of "potential
69. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3084 (1989) (Stevens, J., con-
curring) ("No one argues today, however, that Missouri can assert a societal interest in increasing its
population as its secular reason for fostering potential life.").
70. "The Court has held that regulation[s] limiting [fundamental] rights... must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155
(1973).
71. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737, 782-92, 794, 807 (1989)
(privacy right is the "right not to have the course of one's life dictated by the state," id. at 807); see
also L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 101-03 (stating that the right to privacy "guarantees each of us the
right not to have the state shackle us with self-defining decisions"). It should be noted, in any event,
that these "state interests" would apply equally to contraception.
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interest" is quite different from that on which a state would have to rely in
support of a law proscribing abortion.
The potential interests of a remainderman are cognizable only on the
assumption that these interests may at some point become actual. On the
same assumption, without deeming a fetus to be an actual person, we could
still speak of its potential interests in someone's will, in being born to a
mother who wants her child, or more generally in the condition of the world
into which it will be delivered. All such potential interests are, however,
contingent on the potential person's becoming an actual person with actual
interests. They are contingent, in short, on the fetus's birth.
To speak of a fetus's interest in being born would be a very different
proposition. We would then have to ascribe to the potential life an actual
interest in actualization itself. But unlike a living remainderman, a potential
life has no actual interests whatsoever; at most it has "potential interests,"
by which is meant interests that may become actual-interests that the po-
tential life would have if it became actual. I am not saying that we cannot
logically conceive of a fetus having an actual interest in being born, in avoid-
ing pretermission, or in a host of other things. We certainly can, but the
moment we do, we have moved beyond "potential life" and are now imagin-
ing the fetus as an actual, independent being.
This is not mere logomachy: A potential thing cannot be said to possess
the very attributes that distinguish it from the actual. Ice, potentially a liq-
uid, does not conform to the shape of a container to which it is transferred; if
it did, we would be obliged to admit it was already a liquid. The distinguish-
ing feature of personhood is this: A person has interests as an end in himself
that command our moral respect, and a person's life commands a degree of
respect above and beyond any other worldly thing. To ascribe these charac-
teristics to a "potential" person is, sub silentio, nothing other than to convert
the potential into the actual.
If doubt remains, consider the extraordinary consequences of ascribing
to potential human life an actual interest in being born. The potential chil-
dren of a proposed marriage are potential persons too. The unfertilized
ovum that may be fertilized on any given night also represents a potential
human life.72 What are the implications of ascribing to each of these poten-
tial lives an actual, protectable interest in being born?
A supporter of the Webster plurality will argue that an "actual potential"
human life, or some such thing, does not come into existence until concep-
tion. But this is the same mistake for which the Webster plurality took Roe
to task. Conception, like viability, brings the "potential life" an important
step closer to actualization, but the "potentiality of human life" clearly exists
before as well as after these two events. I repeat: We cannot ascribe to
potential life an actual interest in anything-and certainly not in its own
life-unless, of course, we are covertly deeming it to be actual rather than
72. See ag., Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in RIGHTS, Jus-
TICE, AND THE BOuNDs OF LIBERTY 159, 183 (1980).
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potential life.
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I suppose it might yet be said that after conception there is something
more "concrete" in existence or that a "natural" process of development has
begun, differentiating an embryo from pre-conception potential lives, and
allowing us to regard the embryo as somehow "more actual." But there is
nothing abstract about pre-conception potential lives. Their cells can be as
biologically real and identifiable as those of a blastocyst. Obviously an un-
conceived potential life requires external resources and certain acts by actual
persons before it can become an actual life, but that is equally true of an
embryo.74 Moreover, the reliance on a "natural process" of gestation and
delivery to distinguish embryos from pre-conception potential lives is spe-
cious. Sex is a "natural process" too. Hence any interference with sex-
whether one treats contraception or marriage as the source of that interfer-
ence-would prevent a potential life's "natural" progress toward actualiza-
tion in the very same way that abortion does.
Thus "potential life" does not begin at conception any more than it be-
gins at viability. Accordingly, if the state has a compelling interest in pro-
tecting "potential life," profound consequences follow. A state could forbid
not only abortion, but contraception as well. More than this, a state could
compel individuals to marry or procreate with specified individuals and at
specific times, all in the name of protecting potential lives. If potential life
has an interest in being born, and if the state can invoke that interest to
supersede the right of privacy, these possibilities, which may or may not be
farfetched, would be well within the arguable scope of constitutional
legislation.
Indeed, these consequences follow from the claim that states can assert a
compelling interest in potential human life regardless of what we say about
fetal "rights." Whether the source of the state interest lies in population
control, social engineering, or the right of a potential person to become ac-
tual, to recognize a compelling state interest in "potential lives" is to subject
to government regulation every one of our decisions about whom we marry
or the conditions under which we procreate. Let us hope, then, that Justice
O'Connor is indeed hesitant to recognize a compelling state interest in po-
tential life that would automatically supersede the right of privacy. Her as-
sociates on the Court who wax vitriolic about the motes in her logic might
do better to reflect upon the planks in their own.
73. Nor could a Webster supporter argue that the state's interest in potential life increases as
actualization approaches. Or rather, he might make this argument, but he would then have to give
up his quarrel with Roe's viability holding. See Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 105, 126-27 (1989); see also note 56 supra (suggesting that state's interest in prohibiting
abortion to protect potential life does not increase as pregnancy progresses).
74. See Olsen, supra note 73, at 127-28. Note that we are not here dealing with the claim that
actual life, or personhood, begins upon conception. As to that claim, the genetic completion
achieved at fertilization arguably does become relevant. See text accompanying notes 112-113 infra.
Here, the question is solely whether the 'potentiality of human life" begins upon conception, to
which the answer is plainly no.
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Ill. THE PERSONHOOD OF THE FETUS
Grant, then, that no interest in "potential life" permits a state to prohibit
abortion-at any stage of pregnancy. Abortion can be prohibited only when
a state is permitted to look upon the fetus as an actual person, with an actual
interest in its own life. If this is so, then there is no evading the question of
the fetus's personhood. In order to uphold any proscription of abortion--or
to strike one down-a court must decide when a state may deem the fetus an
independent human being.7
5
But if the abortion question boils down to a determination concerning
the fetus's humanity, then considerations of judicial competence may be-
come pressing. "Judicial deference," it will be said, "is not only the wisest
course; it is the only course. Your entire argument supports those of us who
have always maintained that the judiciary can have nothing to say about
abortion."
Why has the question of the fetus's humanity been met by such a
steadfast silence in the Supreme Court? Perhaps such discretion is justified;
if so, then we have reached an impasse and must give up our inquiry here.
Thus, we are obliged to analyze this jurisprudential silence before we are
entitled to break it.
A. That the Judiciary Must Address the Question
Four principal claims can be made to explain why silence is the only
sound judicial response on the subject of fetal personhood. Let us consider
them one at a time.
1. "It is a matter offaith, and the Constitution can have nothing to say
about it. "
To be sure, the point at which human life begins is an article of faith in
certain religions. But it does not follow that constitutional law must there-
fore be silent. To the contrary, if the question were solely a matter of reli-
gion, then the establishment clause would preclude states from enacting any
particular answer into law.
76
This is not to say that no state may enact an abortion law in conflict with
someone's religious beliefs. But to do so, a state must have legitimate secular
interests supporting its legislation.77 Here, as we have seen, determining the
fetus's humanity is a prerequisite to establishing a sufficient secular interest.
If this determination were in turn solely a religious one, then no prohibition
of abortion could be sustained. Far from requiring constitutional deference
75. Again, we are assuming a doctrinal framework in which the privacy right in general and
the contraception cases in particular have not been repudiated. See notes 20-22 supra and accompa-
nying text.
76. Justice Stevens seems to think the question of life's beginning is solely a religious one and,
given that premise, correctly draws this conclusion. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109
S. Ct. 3040, 3082-83 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Eg., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); L. TRIBE, supra note 35, § 14-9 at 1204-05.
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to state legislation, the argument from faith militates in favor of the most
extreme constitutional resistance to abortion regulations.
2. "It is a matter of personal belief, and state legislation must therefore
be deferred to. "
This position substantially refines the first one. The shift from "faith" to
"personal belief" invokes that amalgam of morality, self-interest, and ideol-
ogy, loosely called a person's "politics," and eliminates the counter-appeal to
the establishment clause that we made a moment ago. Because (the argu-
ment goes) the question of life's beginning is a matter of politics, it is clearly
a matter for political, not judicial, resolution.
78
An abortion rights advocate might reply that matters of deeply held per-
sonal belief are no different from matters of faith and may not be constitu-
tionally settled by legislation. But this response would be foolish.
Legislation constantly decides matters of profoundly contested personal and
moral beliefs. That is one of the chief purposes of legislation.
On the other hand, it is equally fatuous for opponents of abortion rights
simply to insist that "the tools for this 'job' are not to be found in the law-
yer's-and hence not in the judge's-workbox. '' 79 The "tools" for this job
are not in anyone's workbox. But a judge is not a handyman, and he cannot
call in state legislators as professionals whenever he feels out of his depth.
Has anyone ever imagined that the tools to determine what counts as "reli-
gion" are ready to the jurist's hand? Yet, when this determination becomes
dispositive of first amendment rights, the great difficulty of the question per-
mits the judiciary neither to evade it nor to allow the states to answer it.
80
In determining that life begins at a certain gestational point, a state es-
tablishes a compelling interest and thereby delineates the outer limit of a
constitutional right. Courts cannot simply defer to state law on this point.
They can no more defer here than in the case of a state's enactment of a
certain definition of "clear and present danger" allowing the legislature to
prohibit constitutionally protected speech.81
Thus, Justice Scalia has it exactly backward when he says, distinguishing
Roe from Griswold and Eisenstadt, that there can be no constitutional right
to abortion "without volunteering a judicial answer to the nonjusticiable
question of when human life begins." 82 To the contrary, given the contra-
78. See, eg., Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3064-66 (Scalia, J., concurring) (inveighing against "this
Court's self-awarded sovereignty over a field where it has little proper business since the answers to
most of the cruel questions posed are political and not juridical," id. at 3064); Richard A. Epstein,
Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases; 1973 Sup. Cr. Rnv. 159, 175.
79. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2960 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
80. See, eg., United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1227 (2d Cir. 1983) (defining
"religion"), cert denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 35, § 14-6 at 1179-
83 (discussing judicial definitions of religion in first amendment contexts).
81. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 842-45 (1978).
82. Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2984 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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ception cases, a right to abortion cannot be denied without volunteering a
judicial answer to the question of when human life begins.
To see why this is so, suppose a state declared that personhood ends at
sixty-five and on that basis withdrew all protection of life, liberty, and prop-
erty from individuals over that age. Or suppose an overpopulated state em-
barked on a campaign of infanticide, supporting its measures with the
determination that human life did not begin until age five. Personhood is
not and cannot be a "political question." It is a question, indeed the ques-
tion, of who holds legal rights. When the rights at stake are constitutional,
state legislatures plainly are not entitled to the last word. Quite apart from
the right of privacy, the Constitution lodges in the judiciary the ultimate
responsibility to oversee state determinations of personhood.
For this reason, deference to a state's determination that life begins at
conception is a judicial answer to Justice Scalia's "nonjusticiable" question
of when human life begins. Would Justice Scalia permit states to deem life
to begin upon ovulation and on that basis ban contraception or even require
insemination? Presumably not. Would he permit infanticide upon the kind
of state determination referred to above? If, as I assume, the answer is again
no, but if Justice Scalia is prepared to say that, within the gestationalprocess,
states are free to determine the advent of human life as they choose, that
simply means that his judicial answer to this "nonjusticiable" question is
that human life may properly be deemed to begin upon conception. Abor-
tion cannot be flatly prohibited unless the judiciary either (1) abdicates its
constitutional responsibility to oversee state determinations of personhood,
or (2) concurs that fetuses may be regarded as persons from the moment of
conception.
3. "The question of when life begins is beyond human knowledge, and
therefore the judiciary can only draw scorn upon itself by trying to
answer it. "
This position,83 the least clear in its premises, must be admitted to have a
certain attraction. The mystery of life's creation, whether understood relig-
iously or otherwise, is not something to be eagerly sacrificed to judicial rati-
ocination, even that of the wisest judges. Once again, however, the passage
of antiabortion laws forces the judicial hand. If state legislatures were silent
on the abortion question, so too might be the judiciary. Confronted with
laws attempting to qualify a constitutional right, the courts have no choice
but to address the question, imperfect though their answer might be.
At the same time, an important qualification is in order. The judiciary is
obliged to decide when, at the earliest, a state can deem the fetus to be a
person. As we shall see, this is not the same as saying that the Court must
itself decide when (if ever) a fetus is in fact a person.
84
83. For a version of this position, see Epstein, supra note 78, at 175.
84. See texts accompanying notes 97, 110-118 infra.
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4. "The question of when the fetus becomes a person is a matter offact
on which courts have no competence whatsoever. Thus the Constitu-
tion cannot preclude a state from adopting any reasonable medical
determination, including the determination that life begins at
conception. "
This final position is the strongest of the four. What do judges know
about the facts of embryology? There is ultimately only one response to this
objection, but that response is decisive: The point at which a fetus attains
personhood is not a question of fact.
B. That the Question is Not One of Fact
Let us begin with two limiting propositions: First, that the advent of
human life takes place no earlier than conception; second, that it takes place
no later than birth. Although both these propositions command widespread
acceptance, either could in principle be challenged. For purposes of this
essay, however, they simply will be accepted as postulates.
We know, then, that at some point between conception and birth-in-
cluding either of those events, which must themselves be broken down into
smaller and more precisely defined moments 815-a thing comes into being
that we must treat as a person. Let us briefly set forth the relevant facts to
see what they can tell us about where to draw a line.
Within a short time after insemination, a man's gamete may meet with
and penetrate a woman's ovum. If so, fertilization takes place, a process of
about twenty-four hours' duration in which the haploid chromosome sets of
the respective gametes commingle to create a single-celled embryo with a
full, normal complement of forty-six chromosomes.
86
After about a week, the embryo may implant itself in the woman's uter-
ine wall. If it does not, no pregnancy occurs and the embryo is lost. Esti-
mates vary, but it appears that at least one half of all fertilized ova do not
become implanted.
87
Until about two weeks after fertilization, the implanted embryo may still
split into multiple entities (twins, triplets, and so forth). In rare cases, the
opposite can occur-sibling embryos may fuse and develop into a single per-
son who, though otherwise perfectly normal, carries two genetically distinct
sets of cells.88 By eight weeks, the embryo has developed discernible fingers
and toes. By ten weeks, all human organs are present in rudimentary
form,8 9 and inchoate electrical activity is detectable in the embryo's brain
cells. 9°
85. See note 112 infra.
86. SeeA eg., JACK A. PRITCHARD & PAUL C. McDoNALD, WILLIAMS OBSTTRics 79-84
(15th ed. 1985).
87. See id at 89-92; Postcoftal Contraception, 1 LANc-T 855, 856 (1983).
88. See L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 118.
89. See, eg., J. PRITCHARD & P. MCDONALD, supra note 86, at 145.
90. Robert J. Sokol & Mortimer G. Rosen, The Fetal Electroencephalogram, I CLINICS 01-
srETcs & GYNECOLOGY 123 (1974).
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Apart from the brain, development after the twelfth week can generally
be viewed as a matter of growth, rather than the formation of new struc-
tures. The fetal brain, however, begins a period of rapid development be-
tween about the nineteenth and thirtieth week. Only at the twenty-second to
twenty-fourth week does the fetus's cerebral cortex begin to mature, both
structurally and functionally. 91 At about the same time, the fetus's lungs
become capable of respiration. At this point, given current medical technol-
ogy, the fetus can in many cases be made to survive ex utero.92
Sometime around the thirty-eighth week-with a good deal of varia-
tion-natural birth occurs. The emerging infant remains connected to its
mother's umbilical cord, which, until parturition, is its sole source of oxy-
gen. The cord is cut, and the baby thereupon takes its first breath.93
Where in this process shall we say that the fetus attains personhood?
Upon fertilization, when a sort of genetic completion might be said to be
reached?94 At around the twenty-second to twenty-fourth week, when the
organ of higher mental functioning begins to mature and when the fetus
becomes "viable" given our current medical technology?9 5 Or perhaps only
upon parturition, when the fetus takes its first breath as a physically in-
dependent being? 96 Something can be said for all three of these positions or
numerous others. The point is that the facts by themselves are not disposi-
tive; it is a question of attaching significance to these facts.
To be sure, I have presented only the most schematic outline of concep-
tion, gestation, and delivery. Yet were every fact of human ontogeny per-
fectly transparent to us, down to the most minute cellular or even molecular
interactions, we would still remain in our present position: debating the sig-
nificance to be attached to certain events, a problem the facts alone cannot
resolve.
The tendency to reify personhood-to imagine it as a thing that comes
into existence in concrete, factual fashion-may be difficult to overcome.
Consider the development of a planted seed into a tree. Even if we knew
every.fact in this process in complete, scientifically exhaustive detail, we
should still have to take a further step to decide at which point we ought to
deem the seed, or what was once a seed, a tree. We would have to make a
decision, more or less arbitrary, about our concept of "tree" in order to
choose a particular point in this process, after which we would say that this
rhizoid growth or tiny shoot or sapling was a tree.
The concept of "person" embraces a degree of complexity far greater
than that of "tree" and therefore requires more than an act of mere defini-
91. See notes 108-110 infra.
92. See, eg., Nancy K. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95
YALE L.J. 639, 658, 661 (1986); Survey ofAbortion Law, 1980 ARiZ. ST. LJ. 67, 130-31 (stating that
pulmonary function capability, not weight, is the most important determinant of extra-uterine
survival).
93. See, eg., J. PRrrcHARD & P. MCDONALD, supra note 86, at 339-40.
94. See text accompanying notes 111-113 infra.
95. See text accompanying notes 99-110 infra.
96. See text accompanying notes 97-98 infra.
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tion. The concept "person" is ineluctably normative; it is not given by facts
or by definition alone, but by a normative judgment operating definitively on
certain sets of facts. Certainly, in many cases whether we have a "person"
before us may appear a factual question not open to any normative dispute.
For instance, it is not ordinarily controvertible whether an adult human be-
ing is a person, and our certainty in this regard may give the misleading
impression that personhood is a purely factual or objective attribute. But
only a short time ago, it remained very much disputed whether a woman or
black was a person "in the whole sense." Rejecting such propositions ex-
presses not only our factual beliefs but also moral conviction-that differ-
ences of gender and skin color cannot support a differentiation in moral or
legal rights. Because of the normative nature of the judgment of per-
sonhood, neither medical nor scientific expertise can ever be dispositive. 9
7
Hence, no argument can be made that the judiciary must defer to such ex-
pertise in answering the question of when states may deem fetal personhood
to begin.
What does it mean to think of personhood as a matter neither of religion
nor of fact? It means that we must conceptualize personhood in exactly the
same fashion as we conceptualize adulthood: as a conclusory term designat-
ing a point at which we choose to attach to a developing human a certain
legal or moral status. This status will depend not on an inherently disposi-
tive developmental event, but on a combination of the developmental facts
and the consequences that follow from the status. Thus, our determinations
of "adulthood" may well differ in different contexts-for example, drinking
or criminal liability. In each of these contexts, states establish ages for adult-
hood with reference to diverse practical, political, and ethical considerations,
including the potential effects upon others of conferring the status at one age
rather than another. Similarly, when determining whether a fetus is a per-
son in the context of inheritance or tort law, states' analysis need not, and
should not, be the same as for the same determination in the context of
abortion. The question of when personhood begins can be asked in a variety
of legal contexts, and the various normative considerations appropriate to
97. Cf L. TamE, supra note 6, at 119-20 (arguing that science is unable to determine when a
fetus becomes a person); Olsen, supra note 73, at 128 (asserting that the advent of human life is not
"something that can be discovered"); Rhoden, supra note 92, at 671-73 & n.171 (suggesting that fetal
personhood is a normative matter).
Perhaps it will be said that "life" is a factual, biological matter even if "personhood" is norma-
tive. See, eg., John M. Goldenring, The Brain-life Theory: Towards a Consistent Biological Defini-
ton ofHumanness 11 J. MED. ETICS 198, 199 (1985) (purporting to offer a "relatively 'value-free'
and objective" determination of human life, as distinct from a "value-laden" concept of personhood,
which refers to moral or legal "rights"). But this distinction either (1) renders "human life" an
irrelevant term within the abortion debate because what matters is the fetus's acquisition of rights,
see note 1 supra, or (2) is entirely specious because the "value-free" concept of human life turns out
to include a right to life or to have other crucial moral implications rendering it functionally
equivalent to personhood. Se eg., Goldenring, supra, at 202 ('[With] abortions [after the eighth
week] an actual human life is terminated.... Proponents must ... recognize that such late abor-
tions end an actual human life and not just a mass of tissue .... ") (emphasis added).
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these contexts-including the effects on other parties of conferring the status
at one age rather than another-form a decisive element in the analysis.
C. On the Proposition that "Life Begins at Conception"
Let us now return to the proposition that "life begins at conception."
Before we reach this claim, however, let us first consider two other proposi-
tions: (1) that personhood begins at birth; and (2) that personhood begins at
viability. No a priori reasoning dictates the choice of these two possibilities;
we choose them because they stand out as alternatives that deserve consider-
ation and that may elucidate the analysis. Doubtless, we could envision
other possibilities, too.
Can anything be said on behalf of the claim that, for purposes of abortion
law, personhood begins at birth? Certainly. It would allow the drawing of a
fairly bright line, and it would emphasize the moment in human develop-
ment when physical independence is achieved.
But the brightness of the line that could be drawn at birth cannot be a
weighty factor, since many other bright lines could be drawn at earlier gesta-
tional events. Moreover, it would be hard to say that physical independence
per se is a necessary attribute of personhood and harder still to deny the
strength of that intuition which sees a fully developed fetus as morally indis-
tinguishable from an infant.98 I do not say that these observations refute the
claim that personhood begins at birth. They merely show its limitations and
the moral difficulties it entails.
What about viability?99 As the term is usually understood, viability is a
measure of our technology, not the fetus's biology.10° When scientists per-
fect an artificial womb, fetuses will be viable throughout pregnancy. Still,
certain medical authorities have indicated that our ability to achieve fetal
survival ex utero will continue for some time to be dependent upon the fe-
tus's achieving pulmonary capability, which does not occur until about the
twenty-third week of pregnancy.101 Given this supposedly stable level of
technological incapacity,10 2 can viability be defended as the point at which
states are permitted to deem the fetus a person?
Considerable difficulties confront this position. Even today, embryos,
whether conceived in vitro or in utero, can be implanted into another wo-
98. See, ag., Patricia A. King, The Juridical Status of the Fetu.: A Proposal for Legal Protec-
tion of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1647, 1676 (1979); Alan Zaitchik, Viability and the Morality of
Abortion, 10 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 18, 20-21 (1981).
99. It should be recalled that the Roe Court advanced viability not as the advent of actual
human life, but as the point at which the state's interest in potential human life becomes compelling.
See text accompanying notes 36-45 supra.
100. See Rhoden, supra note 92, at 663-68.
101. "Where is an 'anatomic threshold' for fetal survival of about 23-24 weeks of gaAation."
Brief for the American Medical Association et aL as Amici Curiae in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs. at 7, quoted in Webster, 109 S. Ct. 3076 n.9 at 3040 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Estrich
& Sullivan, supra note 56, at 142 (describing the conclusions of the New York State Task Force on
Life and Law).
102. See, ag., Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3076 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe threshold of
fetal viability is, and will remain, no different from what it was at the time Roe was decided.").
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man's uterus and thereafter carried to term.103 This transplantation proce-
dure might suggest that fetuses today are "viable" at the moment of
conception. 3 4 The response that no technology currently exists to achieve
fetal survival between the third day and the twenty-third week of preg-
nancy105 accepts a highly anomalous position: that the embryo is a person
for its first three days, then loses its personhood, and then regains it twenty-
three weeks later. Nor is it satisfactory to answer that viability refers to the
fetus's capacity to survive outside any womb, not just the womb of its con-
ception.1 06 This answer threatens to render the concept of viability entirely
arbitrary. What difference does it make how the fetus can survive, so long as
it can survive outside the womb of the woman seeking to abort it?
In fact, even if we put aside the difficulties raised by embryo transplanta-
tion, the normative significance of viability remains elusive. Is there really
any difference, at least from the standpoint of personhood, between a fetus's
ability to survive through our ministrations and its ability to survive through
its mother's? Surely an adult would not lose his personhood if, due to the
failure of some organ, he were temporarily unable to survive without attach-
ment to some other person's circulatory system.
Despite these considerable problems, the concept of viability holds a
strong normative pull. The advent of personhood is the moment when we
regard the fetus as an end-in-itself, a distinct human life-in-being. The effort
to draw a line for this purpose should perhaps be an effort to identify a
moment when the fetus develops the capacity for some sort of independent
life in the world. If we think of viability in terms of this criterion, we may be
able to meet the difficulties just raised-but only if we are prepared at the
same time to reorient our understanding of viability.
Traditionally understood, viability refers to survivability. Strictly speak-
ing, it refers to the statistical chances of a fetus surviving (into infancy and
beyond) if removed at some given time from its mother's womb. 10 7 If we are
interested in viability as a measure of the fetus's development into a distinct
life-in-being, however, we may be more concerned with the kind of life the
fetus is capable of at any given time, rather than the length. By "viable" we
103. See, ag., Letter to the Editor from Maria Bustillo, John E. Buster, Sydlee W. Cohen,
Fredesminda Hamilton, Ian H. Thorneycroft, James A. Simon, Ingrid A. Rodi, Stephen P. Boyers,
John R. Marshall, John A. Louw, Randolph W. Seed & Richard G. Seed, Delivery of a Healthy
Infant Following Nonsurgical Ovum Transfer, 251 J. A.M.A. 889 (1984); Warren A. Kaplan, Fetal
Research Statutes, Procreative Rights, and the "New Biology" Living in the Interstices of the Law, 21
SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 723, 728-29 (1987) (student author).
104. See Kaplan, supra note 103, at 753-54.
105. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3076 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Fetal Extrauterine
Survivability, Report to the New York State Task Force on Life and Law 10 (1988)).
106. See Rhoden, supra note 92, at 670 n.169 ("Embryo transfer technology, as it exists at
present, does not pose problems for the viability standard, because one can readily argue that an
embryo is not viable if it must be inside some woman's womb.") (emphasis in original).
107. See ii at 659-60 ("Vjiability in utero is simply the prediction that a particular fetus may
survive because infants of its gestational age have previously done so."). As a result, viability has
been defined differently according to the survival percentage deemed necessary. See id. at 660-62.
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may mean able to live in a particular way rather than likely to survive for a
particular amount of time.
Chances of survival are a dubious measure of personhood. Suppose we
knew someone who was probably (or certainly) going to die within a day.
His impending death would hardly disqualify him as a person. Similarly, for
the purposes of determining a fetus's personhood, likelihood of survival
should not be understood as the significant aspect of viability. If, however,
viability means the fetus has developed to the point where it can in some
important sense live as a human being lives, then perhaps a normatively sig-
nificant moment has occurred.
And what might this mean, to live "as a human being lives"? To be sure,
the "as" in this formulation denotes a certain metaphoricity, and there can
no more be an inherent, factual answer to this question than to that of per-
sonhood in general. Have we then introduced under the name of "viability"
a concept unrelated to anything previously understood by that term? Not
necessarily. The stage in human development currently marked by "viabil-
ity" (in its traditional sense) has always carried an implicit significance quite
apart from the fetus's chances of survival. Precisely due to the undeveloped
state of our medical technology, "viability" denotes a fairly advanced state
in fetal development. Viability occurs not only at the time when the fetus's
pulmonary capability begins, but also when its brain begins to take on the
cortical structure capable of higher mental functioning.108 These two impor-
108. Although the results of prenatal brain research are still imprecise, certain important de-
velopments begin at the earliest between weeks 20 and 24 in the cerebral cortex, the part of the brain
"generally agreed . . . [to] set men apart from other mammals, and mammals from other
vertebrates." GORDON M. SHEPHERD, THE SYNAPTIC ORGANIZATION OF THE BRAIN 339 (2d ed.
1979). "It is not until between weeks 24 and 28 that the cerebral ortex ... takes on the structure
that is characteristic of a normal human being." Rhoden, supra note 92, at 663 n.134; see RAYMOND
D. ADAMS & MAURICE VICTOR, PRINCIPLES OF NEUROLOGY 458 (4th ed. 1989); RONALD J. LE-
MIRE, JOHN D. LOESER, RICHARD W. LEECH & ELLSWORTH C. ALVORD, Jn., NonM AL AND
ABNORMAL DEVELOPMENT. OF THE HUMAN NERVOUS SYSTEM 233-39 (1975); Miguel M1ain-
Podilla, Prenatal and Early Postnatal Ontogenesis of the Human Motor Cortex 23 BRAIN REs. 167,
169, 171 (1970) (cerebral cortex of a 20-week-old fetus lacked the "external configuration and the
sulcal pattern that characterizes the human brain" and that were evident in a 28-week-old fetus);
Ken Martyn, Technological Advances and Roe v. Wade: The Need to Rethink Abortion Law, 29
UCLA L. REV. 1194, 1207-08 (1982) (student author).
Perhaps of greatest importance among these structural developments, the interneural connec-
tions within the cerebral cortex-which are essential to all higher mental functioning, see G. SHER-
ERD, supra at 339-remain quite primitive until the seventh month, when "the major production of
synapses commences." R. ADAMS & M. VICTOR, supra, at 458 (synaptogenesis in cerebral cortex
begins between 150th and 180th day); N. Herschkowitz, Brain Development in the Fetus, Neonate,
and Infant, 54 BIOLOGY NEONATE 1, 10 (1988) ("The earliest synapses within the cortical plate are
seen between 19 and 23 weeks gestation."); D. Gareth Jones, Brain Birth and Personal Identity, 15 J.
MED. ETHIcS 173, 177 (1989); note 110 infra.
The electrical activity produced by a fetus's brain also undergoes a significant change at this
time. Although electrical potentials have apparently been recorded in fetuses beginning between
weeks 8 and 14, see Goldenring, supra note 97, at 199; Jones, supra, at 174; Sokol & Rosen, supra
note 90, this activity is inchoate, highly sporadic and disorganized, see note 110 infra, and may not
even be cortical in origin. See Jones, supra, at 177. Minimally organized electrical activity in the
cerebral cortex does not begin until 22 to 24 weeks at the earliest. See, eg., JOHN R. HUGHES, EEG
IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 69-70 (1982); K.J.S. Anand & P.R. Hickey, Pain and Its Effects in the
Human Neonate and Fetus, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1321, 1322 (1987) ("m[lntermittant elec-
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tant developments provide indicia both of independent beingness and of dis-
tinctly human beingness.
At the time Roe was decided, "viability" could play this double role, and
to some extent it still can. So long as fetal survivability occurs at approxi-
mately the twenty-second week, "viability" also refers to the capacity for
distinctly human life, for an existence beyond that of a part in a woman's
body or its mechanical equivalent. And was it not, after all, perhaps the
latter signification that moved the Roe Court when it held that viability mat-
tered because "the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful
life outside the mother's womb?" 1°9 If we are interested in locating an ap-
propriate point to deem the fetus a person, we must understand viability as
the ability to live in some "meaningful" human sense. On that understand-
ing, it becomes a concept concerned with fetal development rather than with
medical developments, and the objections raised against it above are
answered.
Indeed, perhaps we should go further. We have said throughout that no
single answer exists to the question of personhood, and that no biological
development inherently brings personhood into being. But this does not
mean that no limits can be identified as to the earliest possible moment at
which personhood may plausibly be deemed to commence.
Again, adulthood serves as an analogy. Although this status can be con-
ferred earlier or later in varying contexts, there remain limits imposed by the
very concept of adulthood-if the concept is to remain normatively mean-
ingful. It would be absurd (and probably unconstitutional) for states to
deem adulthood to begin at two. So the recognition that a status like adult-
hood derives from normative judgment, not merely factual information, does
not by any means imply that the facts impose no limits whatsoever.
The concept of personhood may have similar limits. If we genuinely dis-
engage ourselves from the tendency to reify-or to theify-personhood, we
must ultimately pin the concept down with criteria pertaining to the distinc-
tive qualities of humanness. To the extent that humans are entitled to moral
treatment different from that accorded to animals, unless we are to indulge
in pure speciesist prejudice, it must have something to do with our mental
capacities-mental here referring not only to our capacity for thought, but
also for speech, self-consciousness, moral experience, certain forms of emo-
tion or spirituality, and so on.
Now we may very well differ in our judgment as to which of these capac-
ities is more important to humanness, and we may also differ as to when in
human ontogeny the relevant capacities are sufficiently developed to merit
the status of personhood. For constitutional purposes, however, we need not
try to resolve this problem once and for all; we need only agree that prior to
troencephalographic bursts in both cerebral hemispheres are first seen at 20 weeks gestation; they
become sustained at 22 weeks and bilaterally synchronous at 26 to 27 weeks."); Gary B. Gertler,
Brain Birth: A Proposal for Defining When a Fetus is Entitled to Human Life Statu 59 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1061 (1986) (student author); Jones, supra, at 177; note 110 infra.
109. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (emphasis added).
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a certain point in development, a fetus could not conceivably be said to pos-
sess such capacities. States undoubtedly have a certain latitude to determine
for themselves when human life begins, but (at least in a constitutional con-
text) their determination must be based on some plausible conception of dis-
tinctly human being. A strong candidate for the earliest possible moment
satisfying this condition is viability (as we have understood the term), when
the fetus's brain develops important attributes of the capacity for distinctly
human mentality. 110
Let us now turn finally to conception. Isn't conception arguably the one
nonarbitrary point a state might choose as the advent of personhood?
Doesn't a link between conception and life's beginning supply an alternative
conception of personhood, "thinner" than viability but no less defensible?
When we consider the proposition that life begins at conception, we must
carefully distinguish between the grounds an individual might entertain in
110. See text accompanying note 108 supra. Some advocates of "brain birth" have proposed
drawing a line at 8 weeks, when the brain may first begin to emit electrical activity, see, ag., JoAeph
W. Dellaperma, Nor Piety Nor Wit The Supreme Court on Abortion, 6 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. RnV.
379, 408 (1974-1975); Goldenring, supra note 97, at 199, or at 10 weeks, when "the connections
between nerve cells first appear." See N.Y. Times, (Nov. 8, 1990), at A28, col. 1 (summarizing
proposal made by philosopher Hans-Martin Sass). If, however, "brain birth" is to serve as the ad-
vent of personhood, these suggestions must be rejected.
First, mere electrical activity cannot signify personhood. One might as well say that a transistor
radio was an independent life entitled to respect as a person. Until at least week 22, "[t]he electrical
activity [in the fetal cerebral cortex] is random, irregular, unresponsive and dissociated." Cherry
Thompson, Cortical Activity in Behaviourial Development, in BRAIN AND BEHAVIOUtAL DEVELOP-
MENT 131, 136 (J. Dickerson & H. McGurk eds. 1982). As noted earlier, minimally organized
cortical activity does not emerge until weeks 20 to 22 at the earliest. See note 108 supra.
Indeed, "the semblance of an adult [EEG] pattern" does not appear until at least week 32.
Jones, supra note 108, at 177. At that time the brain wave amplitudes "drop significantly to within
the range seen in children and adults," Thompson, supra, at 139, and the pattern of momentary
electrical bursts followed by periods of complete cortical inactivity gradually evolves into continu-
ous, organized brain waves. See Charlotte M. Anderson, Ferneando Torres & Angelina Faoro, The
EEG of the Early Premature 60 ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY & CLINICAL NEuRoPHYsIoLOGY 95,
97 (1985); Jones, supra note 108, at 177. Thus if EEG readings alone were the measure, human life
should be deemed to begin at the end not of the eighth week, but of the eighth month of pregnancy.
See Jones, supra note 108, at 177 (32 to 36 weeks).
Similarly, to focus on the initial appearance of interneural connections at eight or ten weeks
misapprehends the fundamentals of brain development. Although a few synapses in the cortical
region may appear quite early in gestation, until at least week 19 such "synapses are present above
and below the cortical plate, but never within it." Mark E. Molliver, Ivica Kostovic & Hendrik Van
Der Loos, The Development of Synapses in Cerebral Cortex of the Human Fetus 50 BRAIN REs. 403,
404 (1973) (original emphasis); accord Herschkowitz, supra note 108, at 10. From their initial em-
bryonic appearance to week 20, the cortical neurons merely develop synaptic "targets" for intra- and
extra-cortical connection. Anand & Hickey, supra note 108, at 1322 (emphasis added). At the same
time, the critical fibers to which these neurons will be joined migrate to the cortical region, but "then
'wait' just below the neocortex until migration and dendritic arborization of cortical neurons are
complete and finally establish synaptic connections between 20 and 24 weeks of gestation. " IL (em-
phasis added).
Thus, if the constitutional task is not to determine when a fetus must or should be considered a
person, but solely to identify the earliest time at which a fetus could possibly be said to have attained
a minimal capacity for distinctively human life, surely that condition can be met no earlier than
weeks 20 to 24, when necessary structural maturation and organized electrical activity first emerge
in the cerebral cortex. Cf J. Korein, Ontogenesis of the Fetal Nervous System: The Onset of Brain
Life, 22 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 982, 983 (1990) (concluding, on similar grounds, that "as a
lower limit, brain life can not begin earlier than the twentieth week") (emphasis in original).
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support of his belief and the grounds a state may advance in support of its
legislation. If the state were permitted to rely on the claim that God infuses
a human soul into every fertilized egg, our analysis would change dramati-
cally. An "ensoulment" claim would present a powerful, indeed essentially
unanswerable, basis for states to choose conception as the moment of per-
sonhood. But religious tenets cannot be relied upon in this context any more
than in others, and hence they are not to be allowed into our inquiry.'
A case, however, can be made for conception without relying on religion.
Fertilization" 12 may be said to represent the moment of genetic completion,
at which point "the entire constitution of the man is clearly, unequivocally
spelled-out, including arms, legs, nervous systems and the like." 113 More-
over, because the development of this genetically complete zygote is a grad-
ual, incremental process, "there is no nonarbitrary line separating a fetus
from a child."
114
These arguments, although standard in the right-to-life literature," 5 are
virtually unintelligible. First, to link personhood to genetic completeness is
untenable. Every cell in our bodies is genetically complete; every nucleus in
every cell spells out the same information about the "entire constitution of
the person." Quite plainly, carrying all the necessary genetic information
about an individual human being cannot be equivalent to being a human
being.
The argument based on the gradualness of gestation fares no better. It
may be the case that no nonarbitrary line can be drawn in our ontogeny
distinguishing between a mere aggregation of cells and a human being enti-
tled to treatment as a person. But that does not make it correct-nor even
plausible-to conclude that the thing at one end of the spectrum is the thing
at the other. No nonarbitrary line separates the hues of green and red. Shall
we conclude that green is red? That night is day?
But a zygote differs from all the other cells in someone's body, it might
be said, and it differs from a color or time of day. The zygote develops into a
whole human being. Might this potential for development be the decisive
factor? The answer is no. An unfertilized ovum also has the potential to
develop into a whole human being, but that does not make it a person. If the
response is that potential development plus genetic completion equals per-
sonhood, the argument still fails. Nucleic transplantation technology (along
with other cloning processes) gives to non-zygotic cells the potential for such
111. See text accompanying notes 76-78 supra.
112. Conception is not necessarily synonymous with fertilization. In fact, the American Medi-
cal Association defines conception as complete only when the fertilized ovum implants itself in the
woman's uterus. See OBsTETRIc-GYNEcOLOoGIC TERMINOLOGY 299, 327 (E. Hughes ed. 1972).
Inasmuch, however, as states seeking to ban abortion would presumably define conception as fertili-
zation, we shall so construe the term here.
113. Davis v. Davis, 15 Faro. L Rep. (BNA) 2097 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1989).
114. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792
(1986) (White, J., dissenting).
115. See- ,g., Olsen, supra note 73, at 127-28 (discussing well-known antiabortion pamphlet
written by Dr. John Willke of the National Right to Life Committee).
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development;11 6 are we then obliged to look upon every cell or nucleus as a
person?1
17
There is in addition a more fundamental problem with attempting to
equate personhood with the potential for development into a "whole human
being." To define "person" as that which has the potential to become a
person renders "personhood" itself an empty or circular concept. In this
view of fetal status, personhood (or human life) denotes no attributes
(mental or physical) that distinguish independent beingness in general or
human beingness in particular, but only the potential a thing has for devel-
oping certain attributes it does not yet possess. A status quite different from
personhood is really at issue here. Genetic completion and the capacity for
development are the defining characteristics of the seed, not the thing itself.
An acorn is not an oak tree. To insist that personhood be understood as the
attainment of a certain level of human development, rather than as the po-
tential for such development, is ultimately to insist that a person must be
distinguished from the biological material of which he is made.
It may be said, however, that in my discussion of viability I already tac-
itly invoked potentiality as the defining feature of personhood. I spoke then
of mental capacities: Isn't the word "capacity" synonymous with potential-
ity? After all, one might argue, the viable fetus cannot reason, speak, or
have moral or spiritual experiences; nor can a newborn baby. Didn't I im-
plicitly rely on the fetus's capacity to develop higher mental faculties, rather
than a present ability to exercise them?
Again, the answer is no. First, a "capacity" (as I have used the term) is
not the same as a potential to develop a certain ability. A sleeping adult
possesses his full complement of intellectual capacities, even if he is not cur-
rently exercising them. This is the sense of capacity-indicating the attain-
ment of a certain level of development, not the potential for further
development-to which my earlier discussion referred.
To be sure, the nature of a fetus's mental capacity is uncertain. Scientists
do not purport to know whether a fetus of any age is capable of thought,
apperception, or other forms of mental experience. 118 But as discussed
above, that was part of our reason for identifying the stage at which the
cerebral cortex attains minimal structural and functional maturity as the
116. See, e.g., Mario R. Capecchi, Altering the Genome by Homologous Recombination, 244
SCIENCE 1288 (June 16, 1989) (discussing cloning of mice from embryo stem cells and certain possi-
ble applications of the process for humans).
117. Drawing the line at fertilization involves other difficulties as well, which have frequently
been pointed out. To say that human life begins at conception means that more than half of all
persons lose their lives before they are a week old (due to the failure of the embryo to implant itself
in the uterus). It also fails to square neatly with the possibility of twinning or fusing of embryos as
much as two weeks later and overemphasizes the degree to which an individual's genes "spell out"
his "arms, legs, nervous system and the like." See, eg., L. TIBE, supra note 6, at 117-18, 123-24;
Deliapenna, supra note 110, at 406.
118. See Elizabeth Hall, When Does Life Begin? An Embryologist Looks at the Abortion De-
bate, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Sept. 1989, at 42 (interview with Clifford Grobstein, professor emeritus
of biological science and public policy at the University of California, San Diego, discussing the
difficulty of determining when the fetus experiences psychic individuality).
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earliest possible time when the fetus may conceivably be said to attain the
capacity for distinctly human mentality. 119
It would be possible to end the inquiry here. The argument would then
be as follows. A prohibition of abortion must rest on a conception of per-
sonhood-actual, not merely potential, personhood-defensible from a non-
religious, normative perspective. Even in the thinnest possible such
conception, personhood can probably be deemed to begin no earlier than
viability. At the very minimum, such a conception must look to some devel-
opmental factors that cannot plausibly be said to exist in a blastocyst.
There is, however, an additional set of considerations we have so far left
out. The proposition that life begins at conception has a very particular
ramification: If accepted, it would permit a state to block abortion alto-
gether. The usual assumption, which we have implicitly adopted, is that this
consequence of the proposition is irrelevant to its defensibility. I suggest
now that this assumption is wrong.
D. The Constitutional Consequences
The fetus's personhood is usually understood to present a question logi-
cally independent of, prior to, and indeed controlling of one's conclusions
about the scope of the woman's right to privacy. On this view, the fact of
the fetus's personhood, once it is determined, supersedes and renders irrele-
vant the values of privacy.
In challenging this understanding, I do not question the conclusion that
a state could override a woman's privacy rights if it were able to determine
in advance that the fetus was a person. The point is that the state cannot
make this determination "in advance." And if personhood cannot be deter-
mined in advance, then the consequences do not "follow." They precede.
As discussed above, personhood is not a fact or a thing but a status that,
like adulthood, properly depends not only on biological developments, but
also on the normative context in which the status is situated. 120 In deciding
the age of adulthood for purposes of drinking or criminal liability, we are
certainly entitled to consider the interests of other parties. The same is true
of personhood. This means the consequences of determining the fetus to be
a person at some particular point may appropriately be regarded as ingredi-
ents of the determination itself. To be sure, there may be contexts where a
fetus's personhood is legally relevant and where the state has relatively un-
fettered discretion to consider or to ignore the interests of other parties in
making its determination. When, however, the fetus's personhood impli-
cates constitutional rights, the state's determination must take into account
the constitutional consequences.
Consider the "exigent circumstances" doctrine in fourth amendment
119. See notes 108, 110 supra.
120. See text accompanying note 43-47 supra.
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law121 or the "clear and present danger" test in first amendment jurispru-
dence. 122 As with personhood in the abortion context, a finding of exigent
circumstances or of a clear and present danger authorizes a state to qualify a
constitutional right. Can there be any doubt that discerning the limits of
these two concepts must include a consideration of the relevant constitu-
tional values? One could approach questions of "exigency" or "danger" as if
they were purely factual, as if they had to be resolved prior to and independ-
ent of the remainder of the fourth or first amendment analysis. So long as
the circumstances involved no plausible dispute, this approach would appear
satisfactory. But as soon as the circumstances raised any appreciable contro-
versy, determining whether the necessary "exigency" or "danger" existed
would plainly demand that we take into account the principles and purposes
of the fourth or first amendment itself.
123
Specifically, when taking these constitutional considerations "into ac-
count," we must be observant of the degree to which a state's proposed de-
termination, if accepted, would cut into the core of the right at issue. To be
sustained, a state's claim of compelling governmental interests must appro-
priately delineate the outer limit of a constitutional right. It cannot be per-
mitted to eviscerate the right altogether.
Would we allow a state to determine that "exigent circumstances" exist
whenever a crime has been committed and the perpetrator remains at large?
Or that a "clear and present danger" comes into being as soon as persons
assemble to demonstrate for a controversial cause? In rejecting these posi-
tions, we could not plausibly say that these circumstances pose no threat to
public safety. Rather, we would straightforwardly say that this kind or de-
gree of threat cannot be sufficient, for the simple reason that the result of
such a rule would eviscerate the constitutional right at stake. It would elimi-
nate altogether the constitutional liberty whose outer boundary was suppos-
edly being drawn.
The same analysis invalidates the proposition that life begins at concep-
tion. As discussed earlier, the right at issue here is the freedom to decide
whether and when to bear children. This is the right recognized in the con-
traception cases124-and indeed in cases decided even before the right to
privacy had a name.1 25 Precisely because it would render abortion com-
121. See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573 (1980).
122. See note 31 supra.
123. See, e.g., Payton, 445 U.S. at 587-90 (fourth amendment); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (first amendment); PAUL FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING
THE SUPREME COURT 27-28 (1949) (first amendment).
124. See text accompanying notes 17-22 supra.
125. See, eg., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating a
statute providing for sterilization of persons convicted of two or more "felonies involving moral
turpitude" and stating that the right to reproduce is "one of the basic civil rights of man," id at
541). The right to marry, which has roots extending still further in our constitutional law, see, e.g.,
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), should also be recognized as encompassing or even
resting on the right to choose whether and with whom to bear children. Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating miscegenation statute).
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pletely unavailable, a state determination that life begins at conception
would not place an outer limit on this right; it would eviscerate the right at
its core.
Only if a state draws its line of personhood sufficiently late in gestation
for women to have time to discover their pregnancy and obtain an abortion
(if they so choose), can women meaningfully retain the right to decide
whether and when to have children.
But an obvious objection will be made here. Deeming life to begin at
conception may "eviscerate" women's freedom to have an abortion, but in
what sense does it "eviscerate" their right to decide whether and when to
have children? After all, it will be said, women under Eisenstadt are guaran-
teed the availability of contraception, and more than that, they can always
choose to avoid sexual intercourse altogether. Hence, even if abortion were
completely prohibited, women would clearly remain free to make their own
reproductive decisions.
This objection is unavailing. 126 First, contraception is no guarantee
against pregnancy. Studies indicate that over half of the women who cur-
rently obtain abortions do use some form of contraception.1 27 Even in the
strongest of cases-assuming women to be fully informed and vigilantly us-
ing one of the more effective contraceptive devices-the odds of pregnancy
would by no means be negligible.128 In actual practice, moreover, effective-
ness rates are not nearly so high as they are claimed to be, which means that
the chances of pregnancy despite contraception are quite substantial even
over the course of a single year.
129
Equally important, the fact is that a great deal of unwanted pregnancies
occur among the women youngest, poorest, least informed, and therefore
least able to employ contraception effectively.1 30 Despite the availability of
contraception, hundreds of thousands of unwanted pregnancies occur each
year, and in every case a blanket prohibition of abortion would mandate
compulsory childbearing. When abortion is prohibited, no woman is guar-
126. In saying so, I do not rely on an argument based on the possibility of rape because the
reply could be that an exception should be made in the event of pregnancies resulting from rape.
Nor do I rely on other forms of "forced" intercourse, see, eg., Olsen, supra note 73, at 125, although
the entire network of pressures directing women into sex and childbearing is undoubtedly relevant
here.
127. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1988, § 1, at 26, col. 1 (discussing studies from the Alan
Guttmacher Institute which found that "slightly more than half the American women who choose
abortion are using a contraceptive during the month in which they conceive").
128. "Even a woman who uses a contraceptive that is 95% effective has a 70% probability of
pregnancy over ten years." Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor. A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of
Abortion, 84 Nw. U.L. REv. 480, 505 (1990).
129. See Betsy A. Lehman, Study: Birth Control Fails More Than Surveys Show, Boston Globe,
July 13, 1989, (National/Foreign), at 3, col. 4 (discussing a study by Alan Guttmacher which found
that birth control "fails more often than currently accepted statistics indicate"). See generally John
A. Ross, Contraception: Short-Term vs. Long-Term Failure Rates 21 FAM. PLAN. PERsp. 275
(1989).
130. See Lehman, supra note 129 ("[Women who are poor, unmarried, young, black or His-
panic... [are] more likely... than other women to use contraception inconsistently, resulting in
unwanted pregnancies ... ").
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anteed the right to decide whether or when to have children, and a large
number of women will in fact have childbearing forced upon them against
their will.
But what of abstinence? Every woman remains perfectly free to abstain
from sex altogether. Given that fundamental freedom, how can even the
strictest antiabortion law be said to "compel" childbearing?
This argument, suggested by Solicitor General Kenneth Starr in a recent
amicus brief,'31 is startling in its spuriousness. To insist upon women's po-
tential "abstinence" is to say that if women have sex, they must accept
childbearing, or at least assume the risk of it. But this is the very opposite of
assuring women the freedom, recognized in Griswold and Eisenstadt, to de-
cide whether and when to bear children. It is to relegate women to the very
same lack of freedom under which they labored before Griswold. A state's
reliance on contraception as a guarantee of women's privacy right is inade-
quate; a state's reliance on abstinence renders the right meaningless.
All this might be granted, but our conclusion may still seem too simple.
"Everything you have said," one might object, "simply proves that the right
to privacy would be strengthened by a right of abortion. But no one disputes
that. The question here is one of balancing the right of privacy against the
fetus's right to life. To say that the right of privacy generally weighs against
regulation of abortion simply restates the problem. It tells us nothing about
where to draw the line. To the contrary, if your argument was accepted, we
would have to conclude that the state could not prohibit abortion at any
time during a woman's pregnancy."
Not at all. If, for example, right-to-life advocates believed that life com-
mences upon quickening and wanted to overturn Roe on that ground, then
the values protected by privacy might not tip the balance one way or the
other. Provided that women who become pregnant are allowed a reasonable
length of time to discover their pregnancy and to obtain an abortion (should
they so choose), women meaningfully retain the constitutional freedom to
make their own childbearing decisions. When abortion is prohibited alto-
gether, they do not. I am not saying that a state cannot determine fetal
personhood to commence upon conception because the right to privacy
"weighs against" it; I am saying that the state cannot do so because that
would eviscerate the right at its core.
"But let's be serious," someone may say. "The availability of contracep-
tion and abstinence may not guarantee a woman's freedom to decide
whether and when to have a children, but surely it goes a long way in that
direction. If a large number of women remain ill-informed about contracep-
tives or simply fail to use them (either properly or at all), that is not the
state's responsibility. At the very least, contraception sufficiently vindicates
131. See Dellinger & Sperling, supra note 29, at 97 n.51 (discussing Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990) (No. 88-
1125)).
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the woman's liberty interest to render a compelling state interest unneces-
sary in the context of abortion laws."
This objection raises two important points. First, so long as women are
permitted a fairly high degree of potential control over their reproductive
decisions, why isn't their constitutional right satisfied? Second, even if not
fully satisfied, perhaps the right receives sufficient protection from the availa-
bility of contraception to allow state regulation of abortion on the basis of
something less than a compelling interest. If so, abortion might be prohib-
ited merely because of our "uncertainty" about the advent of human life, or
merely to "foster respect for human life"-without, in either case, deeming
the fetus an actual human life.
To answer these questions, let us imagine a statute imposing a quarantine
upon any person who contracts the flu. The quarantine consists of a year's
internment in a state institution. We ask the state what compelling interest
justifies this enormous deprivation of liberty. The state's counsel replies,
"Didn't you hear? There's a new pill available that prevents flu with 99.9%
effectiveness, and it's available at any drugstore. Thus, our statute can ad-
versely affect only those who fail to take this pill or those few who catch the
disease notwithstanding."
Supposing those facts are true, can they make any difference? Can they
possibly excuse the state from the necessity of demonstrating a compelling
interest?
"But the two cases are not alike," our original interlocutor will protest.
"The Eisenstadt right is a right to a certain degree of control over one's
reproductive life. Access to contraception satisfies and exhausts the right.
Even if pregnancy ensues, there is simply no constitutional right left for the
state to violate. The situation is entirely different in the case of a right to
physical liberty. This right not to be confined is in no way satisfied by taking
a flu pill."
This rejoinder, assuming it even intelligible, is patently incorrect. Pri-
vacy is also a right not to be confined: a right not to be confined in a life of
the state's choosing; a right not to have the future course of one's life dic-
tated by the state. 132 To be forced by state law to bear a child constitutes the
exemplary case of deprivation of this right. Contraception does not "satisfy"
or "exhaust" the right of privacy. Like the flu pill, it acts as a preventative,
the failure of which cannot permit the state to effect a massive intrusion into
one's liberty.
Moreover, the fact that the abortion laws operate in the field of sexual
desire is itself germane to the need for strict scrutiny. State direction of
individuals' lives is particularly dangerous when effected by laws that oper-
ate on or take advantage of elemental human desires. The formal legal free-
dom to refrain from acting on such desires makes little difference. Indeed,
the preservation of this sort of formal freedom is a characteristic feature of
132. See Rubenfeld, supra note 71, at 787; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 6, at 102-03; Estrich &
Sullivan, supra note 56, at 130.
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the laws invalidated by the right to privacy. 133 Despite the freedom to ab-
stain, men and women always have engaged and always will engage in sexual
intercourse, often at the risk of severe consequences; despite today's availa-
bility of contraceptives, women will become pregnant. A state that flatly
prohibits abortion is fully chargeable with compelling women to bear
children.
But perhaps the case of quarantine laws raises a new problem. "You say
that states may not define their compelling interests in such a way as to
deprive persons completely of a constitutional right. But quarantine laws
prove that states may do so. If a quarantine were genuinely necessitated by a
compelling interest-if, let's say, it was the only way to prevent a plague-
then presumably we would permit the state to intern carriers of the dis-
ease.134 Therefore, I see no reason why the state may not draw its per-
sonhood line at conception, even if this would deprive women of their
privacy right."
Certainly government may abridge constitutional rights when necessary
to protect a compelling state interest; that is what it means to have a compel-
ling state interest doctrine. 135 The point, rather, is that states may not draw
their compelling interest lines so broadly as to eliminate or eviscerate a con-
stitutional right altogether. Thus, in the case of a state's declaration that a
clear and present danger exists whenever people protest the current adminis-
tration's policies, the right at issue would not be limited, but destroyed. In
an important sense, there would be no meaningful right of free speech if
political dissent were forbidden. Similarly, for all the reasons suggested
above, there would be no meaningful right to decide whether and when to
have children if abortion were forbidden.
Our interlocutor gets one last opportunity. "But an antiabortion law no
more eviscerates the right to privacy than the quarantine law eviscerates the
right to liberty. The former applies its restrictions only to women who get
pregnant, just as the latter applies only to those who get the disease. Every-
one else remains perfectly free. If your argument about abortion was right,
then the state could never quarantine anybody."
Two responses are available to us here. First, we might point out that
the condition of carrying a deadly contagion differs significantly in its rela-
tion to the right of liberty from the condition of being pregnant in relation to
the right not to bear children. Saying that everyone but plague carriers re-
mains unincarcerated can mean a great deal; saying that everyone but preg-
nant women remains free not to bear children is absurd. To use the latter
133. For example, miscegenation laws of the sort struck down in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967), leave individuals formally free not to marry or procreate at all, but in substance, channel
persons' lives into the institutions of intraracial marriage and procreation. Similarly, a law limiting
occupancy of dwellings to members of an immediate family, see Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977), exerts a powerful standardizing force on lives even though persons always remain
free to live alone. See Rubenfeld, supra note 71, at 784, 792.
134. Here our objector might cite Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding
an internment despite strict scrutiny).
135. The doctrine could in principle be challenged, but I have made no such argument here.
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proposition in defense of abortion laws is like defending a sedition act on the
ground that it applies only to dissenters: "Everyone else" remains perfectly
free to speak his mind. Sedition and antiabortion laws do not stake out an
outer boundary of a recognized constitutional right; they traverse the right's
very core.
On the other hand, we might accept our interlocutor's invitation to treat
the antiabortion and quarantine contexts as analogous. Today especially it is
easy to imagine a quarantine law that, while supposedly protecting us from a
plague, nonetheless raises the most serious constitutional questions. In both
contexts, the principle would surely hold that states cannot define their com-
pelling interests so broadly as to obliterate constitutional rights.
Moreover, we can imagine what sort of showing the state would have to
make to convince us that a disease compellingly mandated quarantine. But
what sort of showing can the state make to convince us that a newly con-
ceived embryo is a person? Could any showing be "convincing" in the same
sense? Our earlier discussions may not have refuted the proposition that
personhood begins at conception, but surely that proposition fared no bet-
ter-and indeed rather worse-than arguments favoring later gestational
events.
But this very uncertainty might be said to be the chief reason that the
judiciary ought to defer to state determinations of fetal personhood. Doesn't
such uncertainty cut precisely against a single constitutional rule? We have
seen this argument before. If nothing said already has persuaded the reader
of its inapplicability, consider a final illustration. According to the under-
standing of personhood we have tried to elucidate here, the dispositive anal-
ogy would be to a law determining the advent of adulthood in a context
where that determination implicated other individuals' constitutional rights.
For lack of a better example, take the purchase and sale of pornographic but
nonobscene photographs, generally protected by the first amendment. 136
Let us assume, however, that when the subjects photographed are under a
certain age, the distribution of such materials may be barred based upon the
state's compelling interest in protecting the morals or welfare of minors.
13 7
Now suppose that a state, for purposes of pornographic photography,
deems adulthood to begin at forty or even sixty-five. When a buyer brings a
first amendment challenge, the state moves to dismiss, insisting that neither
the Constitution nor the judiciary can have anything to say about the com-
mencement of adulthood. Specifically, the state argues that there can be no
constitutional rule in the face of society's uncertainty about the age at which
true maturity is attained. Surely we would reply that the state's discretion in
determining the age of majority, broad as it may be in many contexts, is
necessarily constrained when constitutional rights are at stake. When the
136. See, eg., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
137. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982); see also Sable Communications, Inc. v.
FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2839 (1989) (recognizing a compelling state interest in protecting minors from
"indecent" speech).
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determination would effectively destroy or eviscerate a constitutional right,
the state has plainly exceeded its constitutional authority.
In the absence of a far more persuasive showing than can be made, a
state cannot for abortion purposes deem life to begin upon conception. Toinsist that a state make a persuasive case is ultimately what it means to de-
mand compelling grounds for the limitation of constitutional rights. Even if,
apart from the constitutional considerations, conception was "just as good"
a point to locate personhood as any other gestational event, nonetheless,
given the constitutional consequences, "just as good" cannot be good
enough.
This, in the end, was the holding of Roe. In light of the state's inability
to demonstrate that a fetus is a person, the Court did "not agree that, by
adopting one theory of life, [a state] may override the rights of pregnant
women at stake." 138 Too strictly construed, this formulation would be in-
correct. A state may override a woman's privacy rights (indeed may only
override them) by "adopting [a] theory of life"-that is, by determining a
point at which to recognize the fetus as an independent human being. The
Court's essential holding, however, was and remains valid: A state may not
completely eviscerate the women's privacy rights by adopting a theory of life
that bars abortion altogether.
IV. CONCLUSION
We can no longer look at prenatal life through Roe's colored glasses. If
and when the Court confronts the insufficiency of "potential life" as a basis
for prohibiting abortion, it will have three coherent options. It can, first of
all, repudiate the right of privacy. This path will not be an easy one, even for
the conservative justices. The Court cannot reject privacy merely on the
ground that the right is not textually specified, unless the Court is prepared
to do away at the same time with a host of other well-established constitu-
tional guarantees. 139 Nor can the Court on any ground abolish the right to
privacy without allowing the states unchecked power to dictate whether we
can use contraceptives, whether or whom we will marry, 14° whether we can
obtain a divorce,1 41 which relatives we can have in our households, 142 which
schools we will send our children to,' 43 and, I should think, even what pro-
fession we can pursue. 144
Second, assuming the Court preserves the right to privacy, it can an-
nounce as a new constitutional standard that states may deem the fetus a
138. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
139. For example, the freedom of association, the immunity from criminal conviction except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the rights to vote and to travel, and every Bill of Rights
guarantee as applied against the states. See, eg., Estrich & Sullivan, supra note 56, at 125 n.12.
140. See, eg., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
141. See, eg., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
142. See, eg., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
143. See, ag., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
144. See Rubenfeld, supra note 71, at 803-04.
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person at any point in pregnancy they choose, so long as this point affords
women a reasonable length of time in which to discover their pregnancy and
obtain an abortion. This would be the minimally defensible constitutional
holding if, as I have suggested, the right of privacy precludes state determi-
nations of fetal personhood that would prohibit abortion altogether. This
standard would, however, have obvious disadvantages. It would lack defi-
niteness, invite additional litigation, result in differing state rules, and so
forth. On the other hand, the Court would be going no further than it had
to go and would be allowing antiabortion states as much leeway in prohibit-
ing abortion as the Constitution could tolerate.145
Finally, the Court can forthrightly decide when states may earliest deem
the fetus to be a person. This alternative would face accusations of arbitrari-
ness and of "judicial legislation,"' 146 but, as we have repeatedly observed, it is
ultimately up to the federal judiciary, not the state legislatures, to determine
the existence of those state interests that allow the abridgment of constitu-
tional rights. If the Court takes this route, the decisive gestational moment
ought to satisfy two conditions: It must be late enough in pregnancy to
assure women a reasonable time to discover their pregnancy and obtain an
abortion, and it should reflect the most minimal (nonreligious) conception of
personhood upon which states could plausibly rely.
In this analysis, viability will again suggest itself. The reason for Roe's
success (such as it was) is that, despite its vocabulary of potential life, the
Court in all essential respects made a determination about when the states
could deem the fetus a person. Viability never made sense as the point at
which the state interest in potential human life becomes compelling. Its ap-
peal lies in its demarcation of a stage at which the fetus, having become
"capable of meaningful life outside the mother's womb,"' 147 may be regarded
as a distinct life-in-being with interests of its own-as, in short, a person.
Viability, in this sense, is by no means a unique or flawless solution to the
problem of locating such a stage in the fetus's development. It is only a good
solution. Under the circumstances, however, that is an excellent
recommendation.
145. Ironically, however, the ability of such states to prohibit abortion at an early stage in
pregnancy could depend on their willingness to make abortion more easily available, say through
public funding of pregnancy tests and abortion facilities.
146. Eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 163.
February 1991]
HeinOnline  -- 43 Stan. L. Rev. 635 1990-1991
HeinOnline  -- 43 Stan. L. Rev. 636 1990-1991
